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International Coordination in the Design
of Macroeconomic Policy Rules
ABSTRACT
The paper examines international issues that arise in the design
and evaluation of macroeconomic policy rules. It begins with a theo-
retical investigation of the effects of fiscal and monetary policy in a
two—country rational expectations model with staggered wage and price
setting and with perfect capital mobility. The results indicate that
with the appropriate choice of policies and with flexible exchange
rates, demand shocks need not give rise to international externalities
or coordination issues. Price shocks, however, do create an external-
ity, and this is the focus of the empirical part of the paper. Using a
simple 7 country model —consistingof Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States —optimalcooperative
and non—cooperative (Nash) policy rules to minimize the variance of
output and inflation in each country are calculated. The cooperative
policies are computed using standard dynamic stochastic programming
techniques and the non—cooperative policies are computed using an
algorithm developed by Finn Kydland. The central result is that the
cooperative policy rules for these countries are more accommodative to





115—t97—9677The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the
irternationaleconomicissues that arise in the design and
evaluation of macroeconomic policy rules. The focus is on the
seven industrialized countries that participate in the annual
summit meetings on economic policy——Cananda, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Although international macroeconomic policy coordination is one
of the main subjects at the summit meetings, there has been
little empirical research on how the policy rules in these seven
countries should in fact be coordinated.
The paper draws heavily on recent closed economy research,
inwhichthere has beenaconsiderable effort devoted to
designing and evaluating alternative policy rules.1 In
multicountry applications, however, the design and evaluation of
macroeconomic policy rules is considerably more difficult than
for a closed economy. Not only are the empirical models more
complicated, but also the issues of policy coordination and
cooperation must be faced when designing rules. Despite these
difficulties, such research would clearly be a useful component
of any attempt to construct a long—lasting macroeconomic policy
for the world economy.It is certainly central to any discussion
of international monetary reform.
The paper begins with a summary of some theoretical
results on the effects of policy in an international economy with
rational expectations. Although, the rational expectations
1assumption may not be appropriate in the period immediately after
a policy reform (when market participants are learning about the
policy), it does seem appropriate for estimating the longer—term
effects of a new policy. We use a two—country rational
expectations model with staggered wage and price setting;
expectations are assumed to be rational In all markets——labor
markets as well as financial markets..Hence, wages are both
"sticky" and "forward—looking."Monetary policy has an effect
on real output, though of a qualitatively different tpe than in
Keynesian models without rational expectations. The demand side
of the model is essentially a souped—up version of the Mundell—
Fleming ISLM model with perfect capital mobility. Using
representative parameter values we illustrate the domestic and
foreign effects of aggregate demand and supply (or price) shocks
in each country.
Although the specific two—country results are o-f interest
on their own right (models with capital mobility, staggered price
setting, and rational expectations have been difficult to analyze
until recently), the more general policy implications are
exploited in the rest of the paper.Under the assumptions that
both monetary and fiscal policy instruments can be controlled
and that the timing of their effects is known, the two—country
model indicates that the effect of aggregate deand shocks on
real output and inflation can be offset by an appropriate
monetary and fiscal policy in each country without affecting
economic performance abroad. Hence, with an efficient choice of
2policies, demand shocks need not give rise to any special
international externality or coordination issues under this set
of policy assumptions. On the other hand, supply shocks do
create an externality. In general even an efficient monetary
policy to deal with supply shocks in each country affects
macroeconomic performance in the other country.Unlike the
case of demand shocks, this "supply—side" externality remains if
the policymakers have perfect control of the instruments.The
policy implication of this supply—side externality is the main
subject of this paper.
In order to measure the quantitative importance of the
externality, an n—country model that simplifies the structure of
the Mundell—Fleming two—country model is developed. This model
is then applied to the seven large summit countries. Parameter
estimates for these countries are obtained, and optimal
cooperative and noncooperative (Cournot—Nash) policy rules to
minimize the fluctuations in real output and inflation are
calculated. The calculation of these cooperative and
noncooperative policy rules for a group of countries can be
viewed as an international extension of a similar calculation
reported in Taylor (1979) for the United States as a closed
economy. The cooperative policy rules are calculated using
standard optimal control theory, and the noncooperative policy
rules are calculated using a control algorithm proposed by
Kydland (197). The main result is that the cooperative policy
rules are more accommodative to inflation than the noncooperative
3policy rules.
1.. TwoCountrieswith Rational Expectations and Mobile Capital.
Table 1 displays the equations of the two country model.
The notation is defined in Table 2.All the variables
except the interest rates and the inflation rates are measured as
logarithms., and all variables are deviations from means or
secular trends. For example, y is the deviation of the log of
realGNP from secular orpotential GNP.Equations (1) through
(6)describe country 1; equations (8) through(13) describe
coLintry 2; anasterisk denotes the variables ofcountry two;
equation (7) is the condition of perfect capital mobility:
the interest rate in country 1 is equal to the interest rate in
country 2 plus the expected rate of depreciation of the currency
of country 1. Because the structure in the two countries is the
same, we need describe only the equations in country 1.
Equation (1) is the"contract" wage (x) equation.. A wage
decision is assumed to last for three years, with only 1/3 of
wages being negotiated in any one year.The wage set at time t
depends on expectations of future wages paid to other workers,
expectations of prices, and expectations of future demand
conditions as proxied by the deviation of real GNP from trend.
Equation (2) defines the average wage in the economy as a whole.
Equation (3) is a markup pricing assumption: domestic goods
prices are a weighted average of wages and the prices of imported
inputs to production measured in domestic currency units. Note
4TABLE 1. TWO COUNTRY MACRO MODEL
Country 1
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-4b-that we do not explicitly model the difference between theprice
ofdomestically produced goods and the price of consumption
goods, due to imported final goods. This would give a further
linkage between foreign prices and domestic prices and wages.
However, the effects on inflation and output would be
observationally equivalent to the approach used here to model
price linkages.Equations (4) and () are textbook IS and LM
curves respectively. The real interest rate differs from the
nominal interest rate according to the rationally expected
inflation rate as described in equation (6).
Theclosedeconomy asa frameof -eference.
Togive some perspective to the two country results we
first examine the effects of monetary and fiscal policy in
the closedeconomydescribed by equations (1) through (6) with
l,f0,and g0. The other parameters are reported in Table 2.
The co—existence of rational expectations and forward—looking,
though sticky, prices gives rise to real interest rate
movements which are unlike traditional ISLM models.
To illustrate the properties of the model, we consider a
money shock, a fiscal shock, and a supply shock. The money
shock is a one percent unanticipated permanent increase in the
money supply, the fiscal shock a one percent unanticipated
permanent rightward shift in the IS curve (equation(4)), and the
supply shoc:: is anunanticipatedtemporary shock to the wage
equation(1). The results are shown in the time series charts in
5Figures 1 and 2. The figures show the actual values of the
variables rather than their logarithms. The parameters are
chosen so that the time unit is about one year, though no attempt
has been made to model the dynamics of the aggregate demand side.
In Figure 1 the fiscal shock is denoted by a square and the money
shock is denoted by a circle.If only a circle appears for
particular period, the effects of the money and fiscal shock are
the same for that period; No attempt has been made to scale the
shocks so as to give similar effects for monetary and fiscal
policy.
Monetary policy has an expected positive effect on output
whichdies out as prices rise and reduce real money balances back
to where they were at the start. Note that the real interest
rate drops more than the nominal rate because of the increase in
expected inflation that occurs at the time of the monetary
stimulus. For this set of parameters the nominal interest rate
hardly drops at all; all the action of monetary policy shows up
in the real interest rate..
Fiscal policy creates a similar dynamic pattern for real
output and the price level. Note, however, that there is a
strong "crowding in" effect of fiscal policy in the short run as
the increase in the expectation of inflation causes a drop in the
real interest rate. Eventually the expected rate of inflation
declines and the real interest rate rises; in the long run
private spending is completely crowded out by government spending
as in any model with price adjustment.Before discussing the supply shock simulations it is
necessary to digress on a technical point involving the effect of
a shift in the expected rate ofinflationon the aggregate
demand curve. The aggregate demand curve is the negatively
sloped relationship between y and p obtained by substituting
equation (4) in to equation (s).Thiscurve will generally shift
with the expected rate of inflation. For example, a monetary
policy rule which holds the money stock constant will result in a
leftward movement in the aggregate demand curve whenever there is
a decline in expected inflation. A lower expected rate of
inflation increases the demand for money. In order to offset
such a drop in aggregate demand the monetary authorities have to
increase the money supply. An efficient monetary policy rule
will generally have a term to reflect this money adjustment.
When expected inflation falls, the money supply is increased.
Such a policy and can be written as
(14) m = +
where is the expected rate of inflation.The parameter
measures how accomodative monetary policy is to price shocks; the
parametermeasures the money adjustment for expected
inf]atjon.' When =—bthis rule eliminates the expected
inflation rate from the aggregate demand curve. In the price
shocksimulationsreported here we consider the case where O
and where =—b. and in each case we set c<=O.Highervalues of c
7iould represent more accommodative policies.
The supply shock results are reported in Figure 2.
expected the shock results in a decline in real output.If there
is no offset for expected inflation (=cD, then there is a large
drop in output in the third period as the expected rate of
inflation is sharply reduced.If there is an offset to the
expectation of inflation (=—b) then there is amuch smoother
responseof output. Notes however, that the money supply is
first reduced and then increased quite sharply to offset the
decline in expected inflation.
Tocour,t'ies bvith a flexible exchange rate.
Theeffects of monetary and fiscal shocks in the full two—
country model are shown in Figure 3 when the exchange rate is
perfectlyflexible. For these simulations the parameters are
assumed to bethe same in both countries and are given in Table
2.In all of these experiments the policy shock occurs in
country1.
Thedynamic impacts in country 1 ofafiscalshockaresimilar
to the closed economy case. The initial impact on real output is
onlyslightly less than in the closed economy, and the effect
diesout at about the same rate. There is also an initial drop
intherealinterestrate and this isthe primary reason for the
strong effect of fiscal policy in the flexible exchange rate
regime. is in the fixedpriceMundell—Fleming model the
exchangerate of country 1appreciates so that exports are
8crowded—out by fiscal policy, but the drop in the real interest
rate stimulates investment. Note. that the long—runoutput effect
of the fiscal shock is slightly positive in country 1. This is
matched by anequal negative long—run output effectin country 2.
However, there is an initial positive output effect in country 2
as the real interest rate first declines before increasing and
crowding outinvestmentspending there. Fiscal policy definitely
has inflationary effects abroad.
The effect of an increase in the money supply in
country 1 is also much like in the closed economy. There is a
positive short—run effect on output that diminishes to zero over
time. Part of the monetary stimulus comes from a depreciation of
the exchange rate for country 1 and part comes from the decline
in real interest rates. There is no significant overshooting o-f
the exchange rate following the monetary impulse. Unlike in the
Mundell—Fleming model, however, the increase in the money supply
is not contractionary abroad. As noted in Carlozzi and Taylor
(1993) a monetary stimulus can have a positive effect abroad
because the price level is not fixed; the depreciation of the
country1 currency reduces prices in country 2 and this reduces
real balances in that country. The real interest rate also
declines slightly in country 2.
The response of the two countries to a supply shock in
country 1 is shown in Figure 4. We assume that the money supply
in both countries responds to a supply shock as in equation (14)
with=O (the squares) or =—b (the circle),and c<=O.As in the
9closed economy the monetary policy that offsets shifts in the
expected inflation rate achieves a smoother path for output.
Thereis a negative foreign output repercussion in response to
the priceshockin country 1. This foreign effect is small
partly because of the smallreal exchangerate and foreign demand
coefficients in this specification.Lessaccommodativepolicies
(<O)would increase the size of the foreign output effect.
TeQOcountries eQith a fixed exchange rate.
For comparison we report in Figure 5 the results from
similar experiments with fixed exchange rates. gain the shocks
occurin country 1. But now country 2 has the responsibility for
maintaining the fixed parity. With perfect capital mobility this
means that country 2 must give LL an independent monetary policy.
The money supply in country 2 must move around in order to keep
the exchange rate fixed.
The short—run output effects of fiscal policy with fixed
exchange rates are a bit weaker in country 1 compared
with the flexible exchange rate case. The output
effects abroad are strongly negative, even in the short run.
There is no short run decline in the real interest rate in
country 2 as there was when the exchange rate could adjust. In
fact the real exchange rate in country 2 oversroots its new
higher long—run equilibrium value. Note that in order to keep
the exchange rate fixed, country 2 must reduce its money supply.
Thismeans that its price level must eventually fall; in the
short run there is thus an expected deflation which raises the
10real interest rate in country 2 for a time above the long—run
equilibrium.
Monetary policy has a slightly weaker effect on real
output in country 1 than in the flexible exchange rate case.In
the long—run the output effect diminishes and the price level
rises by the same amount that the money supply increases. The
effectofthis monetary policy on the other country is much
strongerthan in the case of FlexibLe exchange rates. In order
to keep the exchange rate fixed,themonetary authority in country
2 must expand its money supply by the same amount as the money
increase in country 1. This has stimulative effects on real
output that duplicate the effects of money in country 1.
Figure 6 shows the response in the two countries to a
supply shock in country 1. Country 1 has the same monetary
policy rules as before (=O or =—b, and c<=O) while country 2
must dedicate its money supply to the fixed exchange rate.
Compared to the flexible exchange rate case, the fluctuations in







Figure 1.Fiscal (a) and Monetary (• ) Shocks in a Closed Economy.
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Figure 2. Price Shocks in a Closed Economy with Constant Money () and with Money Adjusted ( • ) for








































101Figure 4. Price Shock in a Two Country Model with Flexible Exchange Rate; Constant Money (D ) and
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Figure 6. Price Shock in a Two Country Model with Fixed Exchange Rates; Constant Money (0) and
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4.5 4.5 —2.4 Class of PolicyRules.
In the previous section we considered three types of
macroeconomic shocks:(1) IS carve shocks whichcould be due to
shifts in any of the behavioral components of total spending
including consumption, investment, or government, (2) LM curve
shockswhich could be due to velocity as well as to money supply
errors, and (3)supplyshockswhichare simply unanticipated
changes in the price (or wage) setting process. As we saw, these
shocks cause both economies to move temporarily from their
equilibriumof full employment and stable prices. The task of
macroeconomicpolicy is either to offset these shocks, or to keep
thedeviations from fullemploymentand price stability as small
as possible.
Rather than calculate the most general type of policy
rules to deal with these shocks we will consider a somewhat
narrower but simpler set'of policy rules. We assume at the start
that the instruments of policy can be controlled without error,
thatthe shocks are observable by policymakers, and that the
magnitudeand timing oftheeffects of policy are known. These
are 1'textbook' assumptions, and though they can be questioned in
the real world, they are a good starting place for studying
policy coordination.
The policy rules that we consider for each country have
fourprescriptive components: (1) use fiscal policy——government
spendingor taxes——to offset IS shocks (thismight be called the
"stabilization" component of policy), (2)use monetary policy to
offset velocity shocks by adjusting the money supply (this is the
12"technical" component of monetary policy; it is already widely
followed in many countries), and (3) use monetary policy to set
the degree of accommodation to supply shocks——that is, to
determine how large a change in output will accompany a given
price shock (this is the "accommodation" component of policy).
The degree ofaccommodationis the central policy rule parameter
thatmust be chosen in computing the best policy aLit of this
class of policies given a particular social welfare function..
Sinc:ethis class ofpolicy rules calls for- an independent
monetarypolicy in each country, it implies one further
prescription: (4) exchange rates are flexible.
The second component of this class of policy rules seems
least objectionable given the assumptions we have made about the
information and control possessed by policymakers.. Some would
argue that the first component gives up opportunities to mix
monetary and fiscal policy in order to influence the size of
investment relative to consumption.. (A compensating advantage
is discussed in the next paragraph). The third and fourth
components are perhaps most controversial; the main alternative
is to forego any choice about monetary accommodation in one of
the two countries (in the two country model) and let the money
supply be dedicated to controlling the exchange rate. Fiscal
policy could then have an additional role of cushioning the
economy temporarily from supply shocks in the country responsible
-forpegging theexchange rate. Compared with pure monetary
ac:commodation, this would cause different interest rate movements
aftera supply shock. It would be useful to consider some of
thesealternatives in future research.
-
13For this class of policy rulesaggregate demand shocks (IS
or LM) to not have any external effects abroad at least forthe
typeof structure portrayed in the twocountry model. This would
not be true if monetary policy were used to stabilizethe economy
in the case of IS shocks; monetary stabilizationpolicy would
require fluctuations in interest rates and with perfectcapital
mobility this would have effects abroad. The use of fiscal
policy to offset IS shocks does not requireany movement in
interest rates. Similarly the use of fiscalpolicy to offset
velocity shocks would requirefluctuationsin interest rates that
wouldhave foreigneffects.
Supply shocks have external effects under this setof
policies except in the special case whenthey are fully
accommodated. A fully accommodated supply shockdoes not have
any effect on real output, and movements in the domesticprice
level d not have any effects abroad becausethey are matched by
equal changes in the floating exchange rate. Whena supply shock
is not fully accommodated there will be bothreal output effects
and price effects and these will haveforeign repurcussions; this
was shown in the previous section. A flexibleexchange rate
cannot isolate other countries from both output andprice
movements abroad.Note also that a policy that fixes the
exchange rate does avoid this problem; as was illustrated in the
previoussection,supplyshocks have external effectswhether
exchangerates arefixed or flexible.
3. SimJe Empirical Framework forComputjnc Policy Rules.
In this section we develop an simple framework tocompute
14optimal cooperative and non—cooperative policies forseveral
countries. Essentially weattempt to use a semi—reducedform
modelto describe the relation between inflation and output when
each country is followingapolicy rule of the typedescribed
above.In this way we make use of the fact that more complex
rules that require a full structural model to analyze are not
being used.
7e'o cow,tris
Considerfirst the following two reduced form price
equations for two countries:
(1) = + — +
(16) = + —Yit+ uz ,
wherethe variables are defined as in Section 1 except that we
Use the subscripts 1 and 2 to distinguish between the two
countries. There are stochastic shocks to each equation
denoted by U1 and These are the "supply" shocks; in
general they are correlated between the countries (eg. world
Supply shocks), and in the empirical work below we use the actual
estimated correlation.
The price equations are meant to capture the interaction
between the two countries that would be expected when the
previouslydescribed class of policy rules is being used. The
parameters are assumed to be positive. Here theyare thesame in
each country. but this assumption will be dropped in theempirical workwhich •follows.Inflationin each country is
assumed to depend on its own lagged value——an indication of
expectationsof inflation as well as inertiadue to contracts.
Inflation in each country is also assumed to be positively
related to demand in the same country as measured by real output
relative to trend. Note that demand conditions in one country
have an influence on inflation in the other country. This
influence will be negative if exchange rates are flexible and
monetary policy is used to steer aggregate demand after a supply
shock,asistrueof the policy rules considered here.
reduction in realoutputin country 2 caused by arestrictive
monetary policy after an inflationary supply shock in that
country will cause the exchange ratetoappreciate in coLintry 1.
Dueto linkagesfrom exchange rates toprices (see equations (3)
and(10)), the appreciation will tend to reduce inflation in
country1(e., goes down), andtheequivalent depreciation in
country 2 will tend to increase inflation in that country.
Hence, the direct positive effects ofaggregatedemand in country
1 will be augmented by the exchange rate movements and these same
movements will create a negative coefficient on aggregate demand
in the inflation equation in country 2.(If exchange rates are
fixed or if fiscal policy is used to cushion supply shocks, then
this argument will no longer hold andmay be negative).
The price equations (1) and (16) have abstracted from the
specific dynamics ofthestaggered contract model in the original
two countrymodel. Inparticularthe e<plicit forward—looking
behavior is now assumed to have been incorporated in the
parameters. For this reasonequations (1) and (16) are not as
structural as they might be. Perhaps ,a better approximation of
16therward—looking behavior explicit in the model f Section 1
would be to replace the actual output variables on theright—hand
side with expectations of these variables——thisapproach was
taken in Taylor (1979).
Now consider the aggregate demand side of the model. The
policy rules described above will give rise the following types
of reduced form aggregate demand equations for the two countries:
y= g.i7Tzt_1 +
(18) y+ = +g7rt_z -
Theseequations represent the outcome of a particular policy for
adjusting the level of aggregate demand in response to inflation.
Inwriting (17) and (18) we are exploiting the first and second
components of the policy rules: that aggregate demand shocks are
perfectly offset without foreign repurcussions if aggregate
demandshocks remained then disturbances wouldbe added to
the equations,and the correlation between these disturbances
would be affected by policy. The policyparametersin (17) and
(18) depend on howaccommodative monetary policy is to supply
shocks.
Optimal Rules in the Stochastic Steady State.
Thepolicy problem is to find values for the g—parameters
in (17) and(18)to maximize social welfare, This is a dynamic
problem: there are lags and we are interested in social welfare
for many periods. practical way to deal with these dynamics is
17to focus on macroeconomic performance in the stochastic steady
state. The stochastic equilibrium describes how the economy
reacts on average to shocks——the typical business cycle
fluctuations of outpJt and inflation. It also captures the
essential ways that policy can affect macroeconomic performance
by altering the size of the fluctuations of output and inflation.
The variance of output and inflation is a convenient measure of
thesizeof these business cycle fluctuations.
By +oc:ussing on the stochastic equilibrium we are
implicitly assuming an infinite time horizon for policy choice
with no discounting. This seems appropriate for macroeconomic
po].icy. We also are implicitly assuming that time inconsistency
will not be a problem: once a policy rule is chosen we assume
that it wi].l remain in Force with no attempt by the policymakers
to exploitthe past committments ofeconomic agents.
Usinggametheory terminology we implicitly assume that the
policymakers in each country are dominant players in a game with
the residents of that country, and that the solution to game is
timeconsistent. There is also a game between countries and
this is where the issue of coordination or cooperation arises.
We consider two alternative solutions to this multicountry game:
the cooperative solution which is motivated by positive economic
considerations, and the non—cooperative (Cournot—Nash) solution
which is motivated by normative or descriptive considerations.
Analternative to the latter is to use a dominant player solution
for the international game with the U.S. being the dominant
p1 aycr.
Tobe specific consider the following welfare loss for each
country in the two country set—up:
18(19) Xvar(7r+) +(l—X)var(y)
where X is a weight between 0 and 1representing the relative
cost of inflation and output fluctuations, and where i 1 or 2
for country 1 or 2.The variances in (19) are the variances
of the steady -state stochastic equilibrium when thepolicy rules
in (17) and (18) are being used.
The optimal cooperative policy is easy to describe and
compute.Thetwo countries choose the g—parameters of the policy
rulesin(17) and (18) that minimize a weighted sum of (19) for i
equal 1 and 2; determining which country gets the higher weight
on its loss function in this cooperative effort is a matter for
negotiation. We will assume that the weights are equal.
The non—cooperative (Cournot—Nash) optimal rules are
described as follows: country 1 minimizes its welfare loss
(19) in the steady state (for i=1) taking country Vs policy rule
(18) as given; similarly country 2 minimizes (19) in the steady
state (for i2) taking country l's policy rule (17) as given;
the Cournot—Nash equilibrium occurs when the rule that country 1
takes as given is optimal for country 2, and the rule that
country 2 takes as given is optimal for country 1.In this two—
country symmetric model the non—cDoperative policy rules can
easily be computed by iterating each country's minimi:ation
(Notethatif the two countries are the same then the optimal
policies in the two countries will be the same so that g =g.
and g1 =
Example.Consider the two types of rules for the case
19where the welfare weight X =. ineach country, and where
5.621, =.266,=.13;.thevariance of the shocks u1 and uis
1, andthe covariance between the shocks is zero.(These 3and
parameter values are what one obtains from a simple unconstrained
Phillipscurve regression over the 1970—82 period). The policy
rule parameters are given below:
OptimalCooperativePolicy Rules
AccommodationParameters (y) Inflation in IInflation in 2
Country 1 —.207 .072
Country 2 .072 —.207
Optimal Non—cooperative (Cournc,t Nash) Policy Rules
AccommodationParameters (g)
Inflation in 1 Inflation in 2
Country 1 —.223 —.011
Country 2 —.011 —.223
Notethe cooperative solution involves more accommodation
than the non—cooperative solution: both countries do not let
quite as deep a recessionoccurafter an inflation shock when the
rulesare chosen cooperatively. For these parameter values the
differences in accommodation are not large, however.
The policies are not only different in the accommodation to
dornstic inflation. Both sets of policies involve some reaction
to foreign inflationary developments; that is, g1 andg, are
not zero. The cooperative policies call for a stimulus to
20aggregate demand when there is a rise in inflation in the other
country. This permits the other country to appreciate its
currency by a larger amount and helps to reduce inflation there.
The boost to aggregate demand at home is not considered a gain in
welfare, however, so that the "gain from trade" implicit in the
cooperative solution is in the form of an agreement for the other
country to help out in a similar way when the inflation situation
reverses.
The non—cooperative rule has the opposite response to
inflation in the other country. This occurs because without
cooperation there is a tendency for each country to counteract
someof the exchange rate effects caused by the policy in the
other country. For example, starting from a cooperative
equilibrium each country can improve its macro performance by
matching the policy of the other country; if one country
contracts in response to an inflation shock, the other country
canreducethe inflationary consequences of the exchange rate
depreciation by similarly contracting. This means changing the
g coefficient from positive to negative. Of course, this
action will likely result in a change in the policy rule in the
other country, and eventually both countries are worse off than
they were in the cooperative mode.
TheGereral fr1dti—Cow,tr' Case,
Generalizingthe model and the policy problem in equations
(15) through (19) to thecaseof an arbitrary number of countries
thatarenot necessarily alike in their economic structure or in
theirmacropolicy preferences is fairlystraightforward.
Equations(15) and (16) become
21.(20) =T_i +Ey+u+,i=1,.,n.
The policy rules foreachcountry become
(21)
,
Thesums in (20) and (21) are from 1 to n Finally the welfare
functionisgiven fc,reachof the n countries by (19) for
1=1
This model canbe put ina matrix form convenient•for
computingtheoptimal steadystate rules as follows:
(22)z =Dz. 2.+ Cx. + u.
— I——,— t2.
herez.., = and
ihere x.,, =(yit,..,y,,+.), Thematrix •D is 2n by 2n with the only
nonzeroelementson the diagonal of the upper lefthand n by n
blockwhichhas the parameterson the diagonal and zeros
elsewhere. The matrix C is 2n by n and has the 8parameters
in the n by n matrix in its upper half and the n by n identity
matrix in its lower half. Finally, 6 is an n by 2n matrix with
the policy rule coefficients g in the first n columns and zeros
inthelast n columns. (These zeros are the weights on the
lagged demand terms in the policy rule which we know will be zero
in this problem but not in a general optimal control problem of
the form (22) and (23)).Calculation of the cooperative equilibrium requires some
way of weighting the welfare functions in each country. We take
the weights to be equal. Then the optimal cooperative policy to
minimize loss in the steady state is given by the solution to
(24) G =—(C'HC)--C'HD,
whereH is the solution to
(2) HL +(D+CG)'H(D÷CG),
where the 2n by 2n diagonal matrix L has X., 1=1,... ,n on the
first n diagonal elements, and 1—X,, i=1,...n on the last n
diagonal elements. This cooperative solution is that given by a
standard optimal control problem (see Chow(1975), for example).
The Cournot—Nash equilibrium solution for the steady state
problem is given by.
(2) G=— C . D
r,Hr,
where the . vectors are the n columns of C, and where H is
given by the solutions to
(27)H L.a. +(D+CG)'H(D÷CG),i1,...,n,
where L. is a 2n by 2n matrixwithall zero except the i element
whichisequal to X and the (n+i)' element which is equal to 1—>. This non—cooperative solution isgiven by Kydland (1975).
The computation of the non—cooperative policies is actually quite
similar to the computation of the optimal policies. The main
computational difference is that one must calculate iidifferent
H matrices for each of the n countries in the non—cooperative
case, but only one H matrix in the cooperative case. Solving
(27)foreach H is no different from solving (25) for H which
part of a standard optimal control problem.. An iterative
— — .._. — _.jI. — — - — — — — I__ ——- —I d #flt — -— —- _t_ — —-- — —- I — -I-- rL,L.t.JLtrLIUTLJr yIyJ.or ..L7I'1)15 mastcOflVefliflt.
Itmay appear paradoxical that neither the cooperative nor
thenon—cooperative policy rules depend on the correlation
betweenthesupply shocks uj.ineach country. Formally, this is
due to the certainty equivalence property of thelinear
behavioralequations and the quadratic loss function. 0+ course
the value of the loss function evaluated at the optimal policies
will depend on the variances and covariances.. When oneseesthe
estimated outcome of the optimal policies——that is, the value of
the loss function——it is likely that one would want to change the
parameters of the loss function, and recompute the policies. For
this reason, the actual choice of policies is likely to depend on
the covariance between the shocks. This may explain the apparant
paradox of the certainty equivalence result in the nulticountry
context.
The value of the loss function when the optimal policies are
being used can be calculatedby substituting (2) with theoptima].
value of S into(22) and evaluating the steady state covariance
matrixof . LetS be thecovariance matrix of the shocks u.
Thenthe steady state covariance matrix denoted by c2 is given
24by the solution to =(D+CG)'c(D÷ce) + S..The steady state
variances ofinflationand output in each o+ the countries are on
the diagonal elements of .Usingthese variances the optimized
value oftheloss function in each country can be evaluated
easily from equation (19).
254.Calculatinp theOptimalPolicy Rules.
Inthissection wereport a set of calculations of
optimal cooperative and non—cooperative policy rules, andthe
resulting values of the loss function for the seven summit
countries. To do this we needparametervalues and of the
inflation equations(20), thecovariance matrix S of the
disturbanc:est.c: these equations, andvaluesofthewelfare
parameters..Because the inflation equations are semi—reduced
forms that partially depend on the policy ru].es being used,
estimatingthemis a precarious task. Most problematic arethe
for i:::.j. the values and even signs ofwhichdepend onwhether
thepol ic:y rules USc flexible orfixedexchange rates. For the
optima] poi icycalculationsweneed toassume that the class of
policies with flexible exchange rates is being used.Yetover
any recent sample period someofthesevensummitcountries have
used fixed exchange rates and others haveusedflexible exchange
rates..Moreover,the exchange ratepolicieshave changed for
some of thecountries.
Thefollowing prodedure wasfinally used:e Over the 1970—
1982period individual inflation equations for the seven
countrieswere estimated constraining to equal 1 (the value
for avertical long—run Phillips curve), andincludingonly the
value ofoutput-for the individual country (measured asa
deviationfrom alineartrend).From theseestimatesweobtained
values -for -for the seven countries. Using theresiduals
26from theseequations over-thesame sample period, we then
estimated S. the covariance matrIx between the shocks in each
country. The cofficients of each other country's output
variables ineach equationwere then scaled to be less than the
and proportional to the trade of that country with each other
country.The trade weights w were the values used by Masson
and Elunde].l—Winail(198).More specifically we set
.aw.where a is asc:ale parameter less than one.The
sc.aie parameter is a measure of the overall irnportanc.eofthe
int.eracti on LDetween countri es.Sincethis interacti on is the
focus ofthisstudy we e;perimented with anumberof different
val LICS between 0 and 1.In general theresultswere
qua].i tati vel y similar , though the magni dutes ofthepoll ry
paramet.ers depend on the degree ofinteraction. For space
limitations we only repor-t the optimalpolicies for a•2/3 here.
Thevalucs of all the parametersof the model for this case
arepresentedin Table The effect ofthe"own" demand measure
on inflat.i on :i. s posi Liveneach country. The coefficient, is
surprisingly small for Germany and large for Italy.Note that
the U.S. demandvariablehas arelativelylarge impact on the
inflation equations in the other countriesaccordingto thesE
parameter values.There isalso arelatively large interaction
betweenFrance,Germany, and Italy.Notsurprisingly the
covariances between the inflation shocks ineachcountry are
almostallpositive:exceptions ar-c the covariances 3apan with
respect to France and theU.K. Note alsothat by. this measure
27the inf 1 ati on shocks are largest. inJapan and the Li. K. The
variance for the U.K. is anorder ofmagnitude larger than the
U.S.
Theoptimal policy rules and resulting welfare loss for each
country and for thegroupas a whole are presented in Tables 4
through 7. The g—parameters of the non—cooperative rulesare
given in Table4 with theresultinQ welfare in Table 5, and g—
parametersof the c:ooperati ye rulesare given in Table 6 with
theresulting welfare in Table 7. The policy rules were computed
for3 different weightson inflation inthe welfare function
(.i,.5 and.9). For threeca].culations we assumed that all
countrieshad the same preferencesqandforone we assumed a mix
of ciifferentpreferences. For the mixed case9ermany was assumed
to havea high weight oninflation and Italy was assumed to have
a low weight on inflation with the othercountries falling in
between. Asonewould expect the policy rule becomes 1 ess
ac:c:ommodatj, ye to inflation astheweight oninflationin the
welfarefunction increases.
Acomparison of Tables 4 and 6 clearly indicates that the
cooperative policies are more accommodative to inflation than the
non—cooperative policies, muchasin the symmetric two country
example. For all values of the loss function and for all
countries, the diagonal elements (i=j) are smaller in absolute
value in the cooperative case. Hence, an increasein domestic
inflation call for a smaller decline in output relativeto trend
when countriesarecooperatingintheir choice of rules than when
28they are in anon—cooperative equilibrium.
Theoff—diagonal elements (i>j) or (i<J) are all negative in
thenan—cooperative case:an increase in foreign inflation brings
about a decline in outputathome for each country.In the
cooperative case, however, the off—diagonal accommodation
parameters are usually posit.ive or at least less strongly
negative. There are three e>ceptions: compared to the non—
cooperativeequilibrium,(1)with a .1 weight on inflation for
allcountries, France contracts output more strongly in response
to an increase in inflation in Italyin the cooperative case, (2)
witha .9 w'ighton i nil ati oii in all countries, France contracts
outputmorestrongly in response to an increaseininflation in
theU.K.in the cooperative case, and (3) with the mix of welfare
weightsItaly c:ontrac::ts output more stronglyin response t.o an
increasein inflation in Japan in the cooperative case.. These
results are therefore slightly different from the two—country
symmetric: mode]. consi dered previously where all the off—di agonal
parameters were positive in the cooperative case.
Thevalues of the loss function shown in Tablesand 7
indicate how welfare would change as a result of a shift from a
non—cooperative equilibrium to cooperation. The cooperative
policy rule minimizes the simple sum of the loss functions in
each country. Hence, it is not surprising that the sum of the
lossfunctions——a indicator of world macroeconomic performance——
is smaller in the cooperative case The improvementis
proportionate1 y larger when count.ri es have a mi türe of
29prfrice for pricestabilityoveroutput stability.
Notethatthe size oftheimprovement differs accross the
countries according to thiscalculation.Welfare is actually
reduced forGermanyin all the cases that we consider; and it is
reduced for the U.S. as we].1 when the weight on irflation is
small (.1). There are offsetting gains in welfare for Canada,
France, 3apnItalyand the U.K.In order for the change from
non—cooperationto this particular cooperativepolicyrule tobe
Paretoimproving-—at least onecountrybetter offandno country
worse off---some compensati nçj payments would benecessary to
makethis cooperativepolicyanimprovement to Germany(and the
IJ.S. iftheweight. on inflation issmall).More formally we
couldadjust the weights in the sum ofthelossfunctions——
placingaheavier weighton Germany and the U.S.——and
recompute the cooperative poiicyIf thisnew cooperative policy
resulted in a reduction in welfare forsomecountry,then the
weightsc:ouidbeadjusted furtheruntilaPareto improving
coc)perativepolicy ws found. This calculationwouldthen
constitutea formalproof thatthe cooperative policy results in
a Pareto improvementin worldwelfare.
It would also be reasonable to adjust the relative weights
on inflation and outputinthe individual country welfare
functions when calculating the cooperative policies. For example
when the weight oninflationis .9 in all countries, the
improvement in we].fare for Japan, the U.S. and theU.K. showsup
entirely in a reduct.i on in output variance.y adjusting the
30re)ativ& cosLs of inflation and output flLtctuations, some of the
gaincould be placed inareduction in inflation fluctuations as
well..
It is worth noting that there is no particular normative
reasonto weighteach co.rntrythesamein theworld welfare
function.. Perhaps a more utilitarian approach would be to weight
eac:h countrys we].fare in proportion toitspopulation this
woul d be sim:i.1artowel ghti ng each persor the same when computing
wor].d welfare..
4..Summary and Conc1 udi ni Remarks..
The ma:in objective of this paper has been to examine some
of the international issues that arise in designing macroeconomic
policy rules. A theoretical two country rational expectations
model was used to illustrate the effects of monetary and fiscal
policy in an international economy. In brief summary the
following effects werenoted: Astimulative monetary policy has
positive real output effects abroad whether exchange rates are
fixed or flexible, though the foreign effects are much larger
with fixedrates. Astimulative fiscal policy has positve short—
runeffects on output abroadwhen exchange rates are flexible and
negativeeffects whenthe exchange rateis fixed.. An
expansionaryfiscal policyeventually raises real interest rates
abroad, butthere is initiallyadeclinewhenexchangeratesare
flexible,andanover-shooting whenexchange rates are fixed..
Regardless of whether exchange ratesare fixed or flexibledomestic: monetary and +.isc:a]. policyare effective aggregate
demand instrLtments at home even though capital is perfectly
mobile.The international effects of demand shocks are
completely eliminated ifmonetarypolicy is used for LM curve
shocksand fisca].polic:yisusedforIS curve shocks.
Thetwo country model suggests asimple but attractive
classofpo]. :ic::y 'ui es inwhichmonetary policy is usedtooff set
velocity shocks and todeterminethe appropriate amount of
accommodation to inflation, while fiscal pol icy is used to deal
with aggregate spericiing shoc:ks.. Exchange rates needto be
flexible for this classof policyrules because each countryhas
an independent,monetary policy. We noted thatthere is a
potential1 y importantinternational externalityin the choice of
howaccommodativemonetary policy should be whenexchange rates
are flexible. The under].ying reason is the effectof exchange
rateon inflation.
This latter feature of the theoretical twocountrymodel was
highlightedin a simpler n—countrymodel that wasused to examine
policyin the seven summit countries. A comparison of
cooperative and noncooperative optimal macro policy rules for
these seven countries indicated that the cooperative policy rule
is in fact more accommodative regardless of the preferences in
each country.
Finally from a technical viewpoint these results indicate
how some of the new policyevaluation techni ques recently
appliedt. closed ec:onomy models might be applied in anintErnationa1 ccntet.. Themcde1 usedin this paper is stilltoc
aQQreativEeto address many of the important questions about
internationalmonetary and macro policy reform, but the results
are sufficiently promising to indicate that the general
econometric approach could be extended to deal with many
international reform issues.TABLE 3
PARAMETER VALUES USED FOR COMPUTING POLICY RULES
































































(8) Covariance Matrix between Shocks
































































































Italy Japan U.K. U.S.
—.001 —.003 —.008 —.083
—.001 —.001 —.002 —.026
—.000 —.000 —.000 —.001
—.283 —. 004 —.011 —.090
—.002 —.283 —.0114 —.155
—.002 —.003 —.322 —.076
—.003 —.008 —.017 —.330
—.003 —.009 —.025 —.2148
—.0014 —. ooi —.015 —.079
—.000 —.000 —.001 —.007
—.620 —.012 —.0314 —.266
—.007 —.610 —.0141 —.1453
—.oo6 —.010 —.877 —.229
—.009 —.025 —.051 —.896
—.010 —.027 —.0714 —.712
—.012 —.010 —.0146 —.235
—.001 —.001 —.006 —.035




—.003 —.010 —.026 —.253
—.0014 —.0014 —.016 —.086
—.001 —.001 —.006 —.0314
—.2814 —.008 —.028 —.1914
—.005 —.610 —.0142 —.458
—.004 —.011 —.878 —.2314




































NON-COOPERATIVE MULTICOUNTRY POLICY RULES
PercentStandard
Variance (x1O) Loss (x10') Deviation
Weight on
Country a2 2 Aa2 +(i—x)a2 a a Inflation
y w y w y
Canada 55.9 7.2 12.0 7.5 2.7 .1
France 13.6 5.6 9.4 6.6 2.4 .1
Germany 202.1 1.2 21.3 14.2 1.1 .1
Italy 6.3 1.4 2.0 2.6 1.2 .1
Japan 27.0 3.5 5.8 5.2 1.9 .1
U.K. 168.9 20.5 35.4 13.0 4.5 .1
U.S. 13.3 2.7 3.6 3.6 1.6 .1
World Macro Performance: 89.7
Canada 20.8 24.7 22.8 .4.6 5.0 .5
France 15.3 23.8 19.6 3.9 4.9 .5
Germany 146.5 51.5 99.0 12.1 7.2 .5
Italy 3.8 9.6 6.7 1.9 3.1 .5
Japan 15.6 12.9 14.3 4.0 3.6 .5
U.K. 67.0 65.7 66.3 8.2 8.1 .5
U.S. 5.2 13.6 9.4 2.3 3.7 .5
World Macro Performance: 247.1
Canada 9.5 88.5 17.4 3.1 9.4 .9
France 5.9 107.3 16.1 2.4 10.4 .9
Germany 53.5 448.2 92.9 7.3 21.2 .9
Italy 3.2 58.5 8.7 1.8 7.7 .9
Japan 13.6 48.4 17.1 3.7 7.0 .9
U.K. 35.4 208.0 52.6 5.9 i4.4 .9
U.S. 2.8 69.1 9.4 1.7 8.3 .9
World Macro Performance: 214.2
Canada 21.3 47.3 314.3 14.6 6.9 .5
France 17.5 71.9 44.7 14.2 8.5 .5
Germany 52.7 452.2 92.7 7.3 21.3 .9
Italy 10.6 51.7 47.6 3.3 7.2 .1
Japan 15.7 37.0 26.4 4.0 6.1 .5
U.K. 67.3 98.1 82.7 8.2 9.9 .5




Accommodation Parameters (gjj) Weight on
Inflation CanadaFrance GermanyItalyJapan U.K. U.S.
Canada —.315 .007 —.007 .005 .006 .006 —.042 .1
France .008 —.3114 —.009 —.013 .0014 .009 .008 .1
C..rmn.y (7 nRc r)c t119 flIL7 127 i
Italy .016 —.009 —.015 —.267 .015 .013 —.0414 .1
Japan .018 .011 —.009 .017 —.2514 .015 —.108 .1
U.K. .009 —.008 —.009 .009 .008 —.309 —.032 .1
U.S. .0147 .021 —.010 .056 .093 .046 —.260 .1
Canada —.886 .020 —.076 .013 .016 .017 —.1314 .5
France .022 —.917 —.115 .027 .010 .025 .017 .5
Germany .106 .242 —.1443 .1214 .0147 .132 .348 .5
Italy .046 .023 —.131 —.576 .036 .0314 —.132 .5
Japan .0148 .031 —.085 .0143 —.538 .040 —.3.19 .5
U.K. .026 .022 —.093 .022 .020 —.837 —.112 .5
U.S. .110 .0514 —.112 .103 .159 .1014 —.689 .5
Canada —2.200 .0149 —.448 .026 .025 .035 —.1443 .9
France .060 2.1498 —.688 .040 .020 —.054 .002 .9
Germany .295 .638 —2.364 .191 .101 .325 .817 .9
Italy .098 .048 —.723 —.8140 .011 .064 —.330 .9
Japan .080 .068 —.489 .054 —.791 .056 —.795 .9
U.K. .059 .049 —.529 .035 .029—1.888 .362 .9
U.S. .152 .107 —.653 .095 .111 .135—1.517 .9
Canada —.875 .045 —.228 .020 .019 .027 —.108 .5
France .037 —.884 —.340 .031 .013 .037 .050 .5
Germany .267 .621 —1.419 .345 .165 .398 1.078 .9
Italy .061 .089 —.392 —.233 —.027 .057 .014 .1
Japan .069 .075 —.263 .050 —.529 .063 —.256 .5
U.K. .0146 .064 —.281 .035 .027 —.817 —.058 .5
U.S. .135 .107 —.3144 .082 .169 .131 —.624 .5
—33d—TABLE 7
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE:
COOPERATIVE MULTICOUNTRY POLICY RULES
PercentStandard
Variance (xlO—4) Loss (xlO—4) Deviation Weight on
Country a2 Xa2 +(1—x)a2 Inflation
y iT y I
Canada 50.7 5.5 10.0 7.1 2.3 .1
France 39.0 3.5 7.0 6.2 1.9 .1
Germany -213.2 3.2 214.1 i14.6 1.8 .1
Italy 6.1 .5 1.0 2.5 .1 .1
Japan 214.6 2.0 14.3 5.0 1.4 .1
U.K. 161.1 16.4 30.9 12.7 14.1 .1
U.S. 33.5 10.0 4.2 .8 10.0 .1
World Macro Performance: 81.5
Canada 19.2 18.4 18.8 1414 14.3 .5
France 13.9 114.6 114.3 3.7 3.8 .5
Germany 169.3 33.9 ioi.6 13.0 5.8 .5
Italy 3.6 14.3 4.0 1.9 2.1 .5
Japan 15.1 7.4 11.3 3.9 2.7 .5
U.K. 64. 51.8 58.1 8.0 7.2 .5
U.S. 11.9 5.9 8.9 3.5 2.14 .5
World Macro Performance: 217.0
Canada 9.1 68.3 15.0 3.0 8.3 .9
France 5.2 76.9 12.6 2.3 8.8 .9
Germany 68.0 359.9 97.2 8.2 19.0 .9
Italy 3.2 39.9 6.9 1.8 6.3 .9
Japan 13.6 32.3 15.5 3.7 5•7 .9
U.K. 34.8 165.7 47.9 5.9 12.9 .9
U.S. 14.7 42.7 8.5 2.2 6.5 .9
WorldMacro Performance: 203.6
Canada 18.6 23.8 21.2 14.3 14.9 .5
France 11.6 27.1 19.4 3.4 5.2 .5
Germany 112.8 195.1 121.0 10.6 14.0 .9
Italy 6.0 17.1 16.0 2.5 14.1 .1
Japan 15.1 114.2 14.6 39 3.8 .5
U.K. 62.2 55.3 58.8 7.9 74 .5
U.S. 8.6 17.5 13.0 2.9 4.2 .5
WorldMacro Performance: 2614.0
—33e—FOOTNOTES
1.MUCh recent macroeconomic research has been devoted to
developingtechniques to evaluate the economic impact o-F
different policy rules on macroeconomicperformance, primarily on
the business cycle and inflation. Lucas(1976) outlinesthe case
for looking at macroeconomic policyas a rule. Sargent (1984)
provides a more recent discussion and addresses some of the
reservationsraisedby Sims (1982). Forsome examples of applicationsof the rules approach see Taylor (1979,1980, 1982a)
It should be emphasized that one need not takea doctrinaire view
on the rules versus discretion approach to policy. more
practical view is that there are some unique (non—recurrent)
macroeconomic events that require intelligent policy analysis and thatare not well—suited to a ruleof the game approach, but that
-in most business cycles there aremany common recurrent features
that are best approached usingpolicy rules.
2. Econometric research on policy coordination israpidly
expanding. The research related to that reported here can only be
briefly summarized: Taylor (1982b) examines optimal cooperative
policy rules in a mu].ticountry model with limited capital
mobility. Johnson (1982) considers non—cooperative (Nash) policy
rules in a similar 2 country model, building on the work of
Hamada (1974).In Carlozzi and Taylor (1983) policy rules in a 2
country (symmetric) model with perfect capital mobility are
considered, Papeil (1984) has examined the effects of
alternative monetary accommodation rules in an empirical two
country model of the United States and Germany. A careful
theoretical examination of alternative solution concepts in two
countrymacropolicy problems is presented Car-izoneri and Gray
1983). There are also several papers thatconsideroptimal one-
time paths (i.e. open loop) for the policy instruments. Sachs
(1983) uses a theoretical two country model to deriveoptimal
cooperative and noncooperative open loop paths for policy. More
recently Oudiz and Sachs (1984) have computed optimal cooperative
and noncooperative open loop paths for policy instruments in
Germany, Japan, and the U.S. using empirical econometric models
obtained by linearizing the Japanese Planning Agency's model and theFederal Reserve Board's Multicountry Modal.
3.This externa]. itywas noted arid measuredin the paper of
Carlozziand Taylor (1983).
4.The results reported below on monetarypolicywith flexible
34exchange rates in this model were previously reported in Carlozzi
and Taylor (1983). The results on' fiscal policy with, flexible
exchange rates, and on monetary and fiscal policy with •fixed
exchange rates are reported in this paper for the •first time..
5.The model is solved using the extended path algorithm
described in Fair and Taylor (1984). Since the model is linear
the extended path algorithm, which was designed for nonlinear
models, is too powerful and expensive. A more efficient
approach would be the iterative factorization algorithm desribed
in Dagli and Taylor (1983). The model could also be solve by
computing the roots e;plicitiy as in Blanchard and Kahn (1980),
though For the higher order models this might not he practical.
6.Notethatif there are no demand shocks we can equivalently
write policy in terms of the real interest rate as r =
wherec =h(1—o)/dwith h=(a +bid)—1.This Interest rate
policy is in the form of a price rule.
7. See Shubik (1981) for a discussion of Cournot—Nash non—
cooperative equilibria. From a descriptive viewpoint it is not
clear that this is the best non—cooperative solution concept for
countries choosing macro policy rules. Moreover, if we imagine
the Cournot—Nash equilibrium solution being arrived at in
practice through an iterative process in real time, the process
would be implausiblyslow formacro policy rules. Recall that
the "reaction functions" are in terms ofthe par'eeters ofthe
policyrules rather than in the actual policy instruments.
8..I originally intended to estimate the inflation equations for
all seven countries with the nine right—hand side variables
included without constraints, but the degrees of freedom became
distressingly low.I therefore considered an unconstrained
estimation for only four of countries, but even then parameter
estimates appeared implausible for certain countries. Finally,
rather than reduce the number of countries I decided to
impose this plausible though somewhat arbitrary structure.
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